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The Future of School Vouchers in Light of the
Past Chaos of the Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence
Criticism of the public education system is ever increasing. Complaints range from failures in academics to discipline problems.' These
complaints are motivating public officials to look for new solutions.2
The issuance of school vouchers is one proposal to revamp the United
States educational system that has received a lot of attention and
recently resulted in controversy. Voucher programs have been formally
adopted in a few states, are being considered in others, and are increasingly becoming a part of political rhetoric.
The overall success of the sectarian schools and the inadequacy of
many public schools have given rise to a movement for parental choice
in education. In response to these realities, efforts to provide additional
educational opportunities are being made throughout the country. Public
officials around the country are desperately seeking creative alternatives
to provide increased educational opportunities in their communities.4
Vouchers provide government money for tuition for the school of
the parents' choice,5 thus introducing a "market-oriented approach to
educational reform." 6 The idea is that choice will stimulate competition,
which will force schools to improve or go out of business.7
The use of government funds for religious education, however,
implicates our constitutionally established separation of church and
state. The United States Supreme Court has ruled on various instances
of governmental aid to religious institutions. These cases have not,
however, provided clarity in this area of constitutional law. Old precedents providing guidance for the constitutionality of church-state issues
1. Edd Doerr, The Empty Promise of School Vouchers, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1997
(Magazine), at 88.
2. Michael A. Vaccari, Public Purpose and the Public Funding of Sectarian Educational
Institutions: A More Rational Approach After Rosenberger & Agostini, 82 MARQ. L. REV. I

(1998).
3. Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer, God, Money, and Schools: Voucher Programs
Impugn the Separation of Church and State, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1996) (stating that

twenty-three states have considered voucher programs since 1992).
4. Vaccari, supra note 2, at 9.
5. Lori Sham, School Vouchers a Sticky Issue, Backers Have Difficulties Selling Idea, USA
TODAY, Mar. 14, 1996, at 3A.

6. Rodney T. Ogawa & JoSargent Dutton, Parent Involvement and School Choice: Exit and
Voice in Public Schools, URBAN EDUC., Sept. 1997, at 333-53.
7. Sham, supra note 5, at 3A.
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in an educational context have, at least, been weakened by the Court's
more recent decisions.8 The Court has been careful not to overrule the
prior precedents and in fact often appears to rely on them.9 It may

appear to be simply distinguishing new cases from old cases, but the
rules have changed.
This Comment looks at the newly-emerging school choice programs in light of the Supreme Court's changing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. The thesis rejects the thrust of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the latest Establishment Clause cases. I argue that, given the

existing social and economic relationships in the United States, a strict
adherence to first amendment protection of separation of church and
state is not only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment
theory. This Comment will analyze the ideological underpinnings of the

Establishment Clause jurisprudence in order to better recognize how the
Supreme Court is changing in its approach to church and state issues
involving education.
The Establishment Clause jurisprudence is moving toward a theory
of neutrality that is more concerned with the process than the effect of

government action. This analysis adopts definitional neutrality rather
than a balancing approach to the first amendment, and argues that interpretations of the Establishment Clause should focus on the process. The

main difference between the traditional approach and the neutrality
approach to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause lies in an

argument over whether the focus of the religious clauses is the effect of
legislation or the legislative process. Should the main concern of the
8. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding a federally funded program
providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis, taught
on the premises of sectarian schools by government employees); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that providing a deaf student with a government-paid sign
language interpreter who accompanies the student to classes in a sectarian school does not violate
the Establishment Clause); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(holding that the extension of aid to blind student under a state vocational program by making
direct payments to a student enrolled in a sectarian college does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota statute providing tax
deductions for expenses incurred by the taxpayers children attending public and private school
whether sectarian or not); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (striking down a New York statute which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income
students of parochial schools); Lemon v. Kurtman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (creating a threeprong Establishment Clause test: first requiring governmental action to have "a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion . . . ; finally the [action] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' ")
9. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 ("The general nature of our inquiry in this area has been guided,
since the decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), by the "three-part" test laid down
in that case." The court goes on to quote the three-part test, and use it, at least nominally, in the
reasoning.).
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courts in determining when government action has offended the religious clauses be the neutral treatment of religion in the process or the
neutral effects upon religion? The main argument of this Comment is
that the best way to protect the freedom of individuals to participate or
not participate in religion is by protecting against government action,
which in effect is not neutral toward religion. An argument will be
made that the Court has not fully adopted a neutrality approach. Predictions about how the Court may deal with vouchers will be made in Part
VI.
I.

DISCUSSION OF

VOUCHERS

School choice has become an important issue in the school reform
debate. School choice varies in its form, funding, and degree of choice.
The first type of school choice programs allow parents to choose from
among public schools, rather than being assigned to a school according
to residency or desegregation requirements.' 0 These programs can be
separated into three groups: intradistrict options, interdistrict transfers,
and magnet schools. Intradistrict choice restricts the choice to the public
schools within a particular district. Interdistrict choice broadens the
options to public schools outside of the district. Magnet schools,
intradistrict or interdistrict, offer programs intended to attract students
with particular interests. 1
The second type of school choice programs allow parents to choose
a public or private school. Privately-funded school vouchers or scholarships, funded by philanthropists, provide poor students with an opportunity to attend a private school. 2
The final and most controversial category provides public funds for
public or private school tuition. The school cashes in the vouchers to the
government for its funding. 3 These voucher plans are surrounded by
questions of social stratification, expense, effectiveness, and constitutionality. 4 This Comment is particularly concerned with these plans,
which use public funds to give choices between private and public
schools.

10. OERI Roundtable on Public Choice, U.S. Dep't. of Educ., Getting Started: How Choice
Can Renew Your Public Schools (1992).
11. NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS, 1993-94:
AVAILABILITY AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION (1997).
12. The Quiet Revolution in School Choice, AM. ENTERPRISE, Mar./Apr., 1997, at 10-11.
13. J.S. Catterall, Education Vouchers, Phi Delta Kappa Educ. Foundation, 1984.
14. Sham, supra, note 5, at 3A.
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School Choice Debate

Vouchers and tuition reimbursement schemes have created a heated
debate. Proponents of the plans argue that vouchers are the answer to a
failing school system. Opponents argue that taking funds away from
public schools will not lead to improvement, or are uncertain that supply
15
and demand will work in the educational arena.
Parental involvement, 16 competition, and diversity of options are
some of the more common reasons why school choice is attractive to
some.' 7 Proponents of vouchers assume that the parents who choose
their child's school will be substantially more satisfied than parents who
are assigned a school. According to a study by the National Center for
Educational Statistics, the percentage of satisfaction among parents who
are able to choose (combining all types of school choice) is high (ninety
percent) but parental satisfaction overall is a high percentage as well
(eighty percent).' 8
Another assumption behind voucher proposals is that they will create healthy competition that will lead to better performance by schools.
A "school's success will be determined by how many students it can
attract."' 9 This competition is seen as a way to match a student's needs
to the programs offered by the school.2 °
One major point of contention in the voucher debate is the issue of
government funding of nonpublic schools. Advocates of these plans
claim that since private schools do a better job of educating, they
deserve the public funds.2 ' Public school supporters, however, deny that
private schools are superior to public schools.22 An October 1994 issue
of Money magazine found that the best public schools outperform most
private schools, and that the average public school teacher has stronger
academic qualifications than the average teacher in private schools.2 3
This study also found that class sizes in public and private schools were
comparable. The curriculum was found to be more challenging in public
schools than in private. The argument that private schools deserve federal money is, thus, suspect.
15. Id.
16.

NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC., USE OF SCHOOL CHOICE (1995) [hereinafter "USE OF SCHOOL CHOICE"].

17. Catterall, supra, note 13.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Apr. 1,
23.

USE OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 16.

Catterall, supra, note 13, at 9.
Id.
Doerr, supra note 1.
See Bob Peterson, Teacher of the Year Gives Vouchers a Failing Grade, PROGRESSIVE,
1997, at 20.
Doerr, supra note 1.
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Vouchers are seen by critics as using tax dollars to fund increased
division between social classes. 24 By introducing competition into education, some schools will attract the best students, parents, and teachers.
The resources provided by certain parents and students, which now are
25
Of
dispersed, will become concentrated into particular schools.
course, if the market is working, this will not happen. The breakdown is
that private schools are still able to pick and choose their student body.
Private schools tend not to provide programs for the physically or mentally disabled. Thus, handicapped, poor, or minority students may still
be unable to attend these schools because of admissions requirements.
In order for vouchers to provide adequate education to special needs
students, the dollar amount of the vouchers needs to reflect the individual needs of the student. Transportation services would also be needed
for any voucher system to provide truly fair access to schools. Yet, most
26
voucher plans do not specify transportation services to private schools,
which may cause some parents to decline vouchers. These types of special services would require an additional layer of bureaucracy that most
voucher supporters do not want to introduce.2 7
Students in poorer schools will have even fewer resources than
before.28 Many see vouchers as taking much-needed funds from public
schools and funneling this money into private schools. 2 9 Additionally,
"cream-skimming of the best students by nonpublic schools would leave
public schools with mostly under-performing pupils." 3 This system is
thought to bring more social stratification. Thus, opponents to the
voucher system point out that its biggest advantages will go to the rich
and hurt the poor and handicapped.
The biggest problem that hangs over all of the other arguments
against vouchers is that vouchers are simply not found to be any more
effective than the current system. Florida's attempt at a voucher program had difficulty getting private schools to participate, 3 ' thus limiting
the competition voucher plans are supposed to foster. Comprehensive
studies by the pro-voucher George H.W. Bush Administration's Depart24. Id.
25. Ogawa & Dutton, supra note 6, at 333-53.
26. Tamara Henry, Florida Pupils Teach Nation About Vouchers, State's System Called a
'Money-Back Guarantee,' USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 1999, at 1D. Florida provides transportation to
public schools in other districts but not to private schools. Id.
27. Cattrell, supra note 13, at 9.
28. Use of School Choice, supra note 16.
29. Peterson, supra note 22, at 20.
30. Doerr, supra note 1, at 88.
31. Henry, supra note 26, at 1D. Four religious schools and one other private school
participated. Lieutenant Governor Frank Brogan speculated that this because, "[many schools are
concerned or are questioning what the relationship will be with the state." Id.
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ment of Education, the Carnegie Foundation, and Jeffrey Henig, Kevin
B. Smith, and Kenneth J. Meier in The Case Against School Choice all
found that voucher programs fail to improve performance, and that they
are expensive to implement.32 Newfoundland, Canada voted in 1995 to
scrap its long-standing voucher system because of its inefficiency and
expense. The province opted to move to a system similar to the United
States system of public schools to improve it's students' performance.33

The actual school options that are available to students will depend on
the value of the voucher. Since elementary schools are cheaper to run
than high schools there may be more to choose from in elementary
grades than secondary.34 Decentralization of the educational system
would erode the common purpose of fostering democratic ideas, appreciation of our pluralistic society, and our sense of national heritage. This
cost is an unknown, dependent upon the particularities of a voucher
plan. As a plan having no proof of even being able to benefit the American educational system, vouchers have many hurdles to overcome before
becoming an acceptable plan to American voters. There are many
unanswered questions as to the true benefits and equity of a voucher
plan.
The problems facing vouchers go beyond policy concerns over the
actual benefits, and implicate the Constitution. The Constitution prohibits government sponsorship of religious organizations. The First
Amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ' 36 These two provisions of the Constitution have given
both sides of the voucher debate a constitutional challenge. The Free
Exercise Clause is used to argue that students attending religious schools
must be given the same tuition benefits as other students so as not to
intrude upon their ability to receive religious training.37 Conversely, the
Establishment Clause is used to argue the unconstitutionality of a
voucher system that includes religious schools.3 8

How tuition payments to parochial schools will withstand scrutiny
under the Establishment Clause is a concern, because nonpublic schools
are pervasively sectarian. A constitutional challenge to a school voucher
32. Doerr, supra note 1.
33. Id.
34. Sham, supra note 5.

35. Id. at 3A.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d
127 (Me. 1999) (alleging that a voucher program excluding religious schools was a violation of
the free exercise clause).

38. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz 1999) (challenging a state tax credit for
donations to school tuition organizations as a violation of the establishment clause).
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program could affect several states currently in the process of implementing voucher programs.39 States considering voucher proposals need
certainty about how to proceed on the matter of religious school
participation.
II.

DUELING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

A.

Free Exercise v. Establishment Clause

The Free Exercise of Religion Clause and the Establishment Clause
of the Constitution counterbalance each other. No other provisions of
the Constitution are as directly at war with each other as are these two.
Although this Comment is concerned with the implication of the Establishment Clause on school vouchers schemes, any complete discussion
of the Establishment Clause must be made in light of its counterpart, the
Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause must not be interpreted
so as to swallow up the Free Exercise Clause, or vice versa. Thus a
discussion of the Establishment Clause requires a discussion of the Free
Exercise Clause as well.
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from acting in a
way that is coercive to one's religious beliefs. "The free exercise
inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the
observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the burden."4 In regards to
religious expression and school attendance, the Supreme Court has held
that a state may not: require students to attend public schools rather than
private schools;'" require Amish children to attend public school after
the eighth grade;42 or prevent parents from choosing religious education
for their children.43

The Constitution does not provide affirmative guarantees of rights,
but rather negative liberties. 4" The Free Exercise Clause is, therefore,
only a guarantee that the government will not act to set up a barrier to
religious practices or favor nonreligious institutions vis-A-vis religious
ones. The protection that the Free Exercise Clause provides is "designed
to prevent the government from impermissibly burdening an individual's free exercise of religion, not to allow an individual to exact special
39. Tony Mauro, Steering Clear of Controversy Court's Inaction Allows Confusion, USA
TODAY, Dec. 23, 1998, at IA.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
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treatment from the government."45 The Free Exercise Clause has been
held not to require funding of the constitutional right to send children to
religious schools."6
The Establishment Clause was intended to protect against "sponsor-

ship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."" 7 The government violates the Establishment Clause
through symbolic endorsement of religion. The Establishment Clause
"has no role in requiring government assistance to make the practice of
religion more available or easier. It simply does not speak to govern-

ment actions that fail to support religion."48 As with any provision of
the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment provides only negative liberty.
"The fact that government cannot exact from [a citizen] a surrender

of one iota of [her] religious scruples does not, of course mean that [she]
can demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them.

For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government
cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact
from the government."" 9
Since both provisions are a part of the Constitution a constant tension is created between the concept of not promoting religion and not
inhibiting religion." The Establishment Clause part of the dual concept
of religious freedom proffered in the First Amendment is an order to

government not to act in an affirmative manner toward religion. The
Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from negative action

toward religion." Read together, government action must affect religion
45. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Snyder
v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir. 1997)).
46. McCarthy v. Hombeck, 590 F. Supp. 936, 945-46 (D.Md. 1984).
47. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
48. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't., 728 A.2d 127, 136 (Me. 1999).
49. Id. at 134. See also Brusca v. Missouri, 332 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D.Mo. 1971) (quoting
with approval Justice Douglas's concurrence in Sherbert); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of
Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990) (holding that a collection of sales and use taxes
applicable to religious materials did not violate organization's free exercise); Lakewood, Ohio
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that "[i]nconvenient economic burdens on religious freedom do not rise to a
constitutionally impermissible infringement of free exercise"). See also Strout v. Comm'r, Me.
Dep't of Educ., 13 F. Supp. 2d 112, 114 (D.Me. 1998) (holding that no right exists to require
taxpayers to subsidize parents' choice to send their children to religious school). Id. at n.13.
50. "The purpose of the Establishment Clause is reflected in the often repeated words of
Thomas Jefferson: to build 'a wall of separation between Church and State,"' Letter from
Thomas Jefferson Replying to Public Address from Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association Of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802) in 3 THE WRrnNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 8-9 (H.A.
Washington ed., 1861).
51. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871) ("The structure of our government has, for the
preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the
other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.").
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neither for better nor worse.
There are certain ways the government comes into contact with
religion-real estate taxes or a police officer directing traffic-which in
the strictest sense of the word affect religion positively or negatively.
This has always been allowed as incidental and normal government

interaction. This sort of contact is inevitable. Take the example of real
estate taxes: if the government exempted religious institutions, then it
would be encouraging religion because there is a tax benefit. This is a
tax imposed upon every property owner, not a special system of providing tax dollars to private institutions, as is the case with vouchers and

other similar programs. This is a fine distinction, but it is more protective of religion to make these distinctions rather than to let religious
institutions be treated like everything else.

The Court has upheld certain government expenditures on religious
schools5 2 and struck down others. 53 The task at hand is to understand
the Court's method of distinguishing between these cases and then

applying this method to vouchers. Some acceptable benefits, according
to the Court, include supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks
to parents of all school children.54 These benefits were allowed because

they were deemed indirect and incidental. "These lines arguably may
not be logical or rational, but they represent the best efforts of the Court
to resolve these most difficult problems." 5
In 1971, the Supreme Court created a three-prong test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman5 6 to be applied to Establishment Clause cases. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-

mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
52. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state allowing a tax-deduction for expenses
incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation to school). Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1947) (state loaning textbooks to individual student within the state regardless of
whether the child attends public or private school); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (state reimbursing parents for expenses incurred in transporting their children to school).
53. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (prohibiting use of public
funds for maintenance and repair of the physical facilities of private schools and tuition grants for
private schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (prohibiting reimbursement for
teachers' salaries and salary supplements, textbooks and instructional materials for private
schools); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973), (striking down reimbursement of
teacher-prepared examination costs to private schools ); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
(prohibiting direct loan of instructional materials to private schools). See also Miller v. Benson,
878 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (1995) (discussing in chronological order the various cases upheld
and struck-down under the establishment clause).
54. Everson, 330 U.S. 16 (stating that the approved plan approached the "verge" of the limits
of the First Amendment). The Sloan v. Lemon Court noted that the aid approved in Everson
"approached the 'verge' of the constitutionally impermissible." Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825,
832 (1973).
55. Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (1995).
56. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."57
An apparent shift in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, evidenced by modifications of the Lemon test, has created
confusion over application of the Lemon test to vouchers. There are
questions as to how vouchers would fare if put to the Lemon test. More
fundamental are questions as to whether Lemon is still applicable precedent.5 1 In recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that it is modifying, or perhaps abandoning, the continually
criticized Lemon test.59 While the results of these cases do not clearly
require the total abandonment of the Lemon test, the Court broke away
from the strict separation idea underlying the Lemon decision. This
apparent new ideological scheme that the Court has applied to the Estab60
lishment Clause has not created any clearer standards than Lemon.
B.

Religion and Education

The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of funding religious
schools in Everson v. Board of Education,6' which involved a New
Jersey statute that reimbursed parents for transportation expenses of
children attending both public and private schools, including religious
schools. While the court upheld these ordinary government services
being provided to religious schools, a strict separationist view of the
religious clause was proffered.6 2 The Court was emphatic that subsidies
to religious schools were highly suspect and, in most instances, would
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Court was true to the separationist language of the opinion in
Everson by showing restraint in applying the precedent. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman,63 the Court did not use Everson as a spring board to launch
an attack on the Establishment Clause. 64 Lemon, a landmark Establishment Clause case, involved a Rhode Island statute that subsidized nonpublic schoolteachers' salaries and a Pennsylvania statute that allowed
57. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
58. Doerr, supra note 1, at 88.
59. See discussion infra Part II.B.
60. See discussion infra Part II.B. Another Supreme Court decision that causes problems for
voucher supporters is Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973). In this case, the Court struck down an attempt to reimburse parents for
denominational school tuition. Id.
61. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

62. "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable." Id. at 18.
63. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64. Id. at 624. See also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (being cautious not to
overstep and use Everson to diminish the Establishment Clause).
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reimbursement of "teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects" in nonpublic schools were struck
down.6 5
The case condensed the history of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence into a three-part test. "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. 6 6
The next major decision concerning funding of religious schools
was Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.67 This case involved a
New York state tuition program that provided reimbursement for lowincome parents whose children attended private schools6 8 and tax breaks
for parents who did not qualify for reimbursement 69 failed the "effects"
prong of the Lemon test. "[T]he effect of the aid is unmistakably to
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions."70
Nyquist is distinguished from Board of Education v. Allen71 and
Everson because the funds provided by the New York program could
not be restricted to the purely secular purposes, as was possible in those
cases.7" Unrestricted grants for reimbursement of private school tuition,
most of which were religious, were held to have the impermissible effect
of advancing religion.7 3 The court based its reasoning on the amount of
money going to religious schools and the ability to separate secular from
non-secular.74
Later, another New York program was struck down under the
Establishment Clause in Aguilar v. Felton.7 5 The Court held that New
York public school teachers could not provide services funded through
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 within
religious schools because such action constituted an excessive entanglement of government with religion, in violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.7 6 Such Title I funds provide remedial
65.
66.
67.
68.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Id. at 767. Eighty-five percent of New York private schools were church affiliated. Id. at

768.
69. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 764.
70. Id. at 783.
71. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968) (finding the benefit was to the parents

and not to the schools themselves).
72. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781-82. See also Sloan v. Lemon 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973); Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 413 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780.
74. Id. at 783.

75. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
76. Id. at 413.
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education, guidance, and counseling to eligible students, those who are
from low income areas and at risk of failing, regardless of whether or
not they attend private or public school. Prior to Aguilar, New York
City provided Title I services to students who attended private schools
by sending public school teachers into the private school.77 A monitor-

ing system was put in place to guard against inculcation of religion by
public school teachers because many of the schools served were religious private schools. 78
The Aguilar Court applied the three-prong Establishment Clause
standard created in Lemon v. Kurtzman.7 9 It reasoned that the program
had a secular purpose of providing remedial services to at-risk students,
thereby satisfying the first prong.8" Although the Court in District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball8 and Meek v. Pittenger8" found similar programs

to be in violation of Lemon's second prong because the program
advanced religion by placing public school teachers in religious school
classrooms. The Aguilar court held this action satisfied the second
prong because it had a neutral effect on religion.83 The Court then
moved to the third and fatal prong, wherein action must not foster an
excessive entanglement of government and religion. 84 The Court found
there was entanglement because public authorities were involved in the
monitoring of teachers to ensure that they did not inculcate religion. In
order to do this, administrative cooperation was required between the
Board of Education and parochial schools, increasing the danger of
political divisiveness." The Court ultimately held in Aguilar that public
school teachers providing instruction within a religious school violated
the Establishment Clause.86

One of the first cases to show a major shift in the Supreme Court's
handling of Establishment Clause cases was Mueller v. Allen.8 7 In
Mueller, the Court allowed parents to deduct expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation to parochial schools from
state taxes.88 Mueller stands for the position that a state may "aid" a
77. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406.
78. Id. at 406-07.
79. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
80. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406.
81. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (striking down a program providing public school teachers to teach
supplemental courses in non-public schools).
82. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down a Pennsylvania law providing loans of educational
materials and equipment directly to religious schools).
83. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-10.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 413-14.
86. Id. at 414.
87. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
88. Id. at 391.
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religious institution without "establishing a religion. ' 89 This distinction,
however, is not that helpful because it merely substitutes one word for
another without defining how merely "aiding" is to be distinguished
from the "establishment" that occurred in Nyquist.9 ° One distinction
between the permissible "aid" and the impermissible "establishment"
that can be gleaned from the case is that aid is provided to all parents
whether or not their child attends public, non-secular private, or secular
private schools. 91 The "flow" of the aid also seems to be important in
Mueller, although this was not a factor in Nyquist.92 The Court makes a
distinction between the direct flow of state funds to private religious
schools in Nyquist9 3 and the primary benefit flowing to the parents in
Mueller, where only by the parents' choice do the religious schools
receive any benefit.94 The disbursement of a benefit to both public and
private schools without distinction was a point made in Everson95 and
Allen. 96 The Court makes a final distinction between the "aid" given in
Mueller and the "establishment" in Nyquist, holding that the tax-deduction of Mueller did not rise to the level of "establishment" as did the
97
tuition payment in Nyquist.

The reasoning of Mueller used the three-prong Lemon test, but
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, used the test in a way
that is inconsistent with the test's origins in Lemon. 98 The Court diminished the importance of Lemon by stating that the precedent, which has
long been used in Establishment Clause cases, is "no more than [a] helpful signpost." 99 The secular purpose requirement established in Lemon
was disposed of quickly." ° The Chief Justice reasoned that two possible secular purposes existed for this statute: (1) ensuring a well-educated
citizenry and (2) assuring continued financial health of private
89. Id. at 398-99.
90. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
91. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 (1983).
92. Id. at 399.
93. The Court in Nyquist noted that the flow of funds to parents rather than directly to
religious schools is just one factor to consider and does not make the statute per se constitutional.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781. This is contradictory to the Court's position toward the impact of the
funds being given to the parents in Mueller. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
94. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
95. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
96. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1947).
97. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396. "[In] Committeefor Public Educ. v. Nyquist.... we held invalid
a New York statute . . . granting thinly disguised "tax benefits," actually amounting to tuition
grants, to the parents of children attending private schools." Id. at 394.
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)).
100. Id. at 394-95.
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schools.'' The Court, not the legislature, provided these purposes.102
In applying the second Lemon prong to the statute, the primary
effect was found not to advance sectarian aims.' 0 3 The Court noted that
broad latitude should be given when the legislature is creating tax classifications. 104 These tax-deductions are equated with deductions for medical expenses and charitable contributions.0 5 The opinion does not
indicate that the government should be any more concerned when the
tax-deductions will benefit a religious institution. 0 6 The Court found
that because this "aid" is given to all parents and is a result of decisions
10 7
made by parents it is not direct aid from the state.
Of great concern is the Court's refusal to look into statistics analyzing whether or not the program will benefit religious schools more than
secular schools.'0 8 This was a vital part of the Nyquist rationale. 0 9 This
allows a statutory plan that primarily benefits religious schools to pass
Establishment Clause muster." 0 Preventing religion from being the primary beneficiary was the exact purpose of the second prong of the
Lemon test."' This interpretation alters to the second prong of the
Lemon test.'1 2 This assertion also departs from the spirit of prior case
law regarding the secular purpose prong. Under the original Lemon
regime, it would be difficult to find that a statute which primarily bene13
fits religious institutions has a secular purpose.'
The final prong, which prohibits excessive entanglement of government with religion, was found not to frustrate the continuance of the
Mueller."4 The petitioners in Mueller claimed that the program's
method of separating religious textbooks from being included in the
deduction given for textbooks entangled government impermissibly with
101. id. at 395.
102. Id. at 395 n.4 (stating no express statement of legislative purpose was given and that the
legislative history does not tell the actual intent).
103. Id. at 396.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 396 n.5.
106. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 (1983).
107. Id. at 399. See also id. at n.6 (distinguishing Nyquist).
108. In the fall semester of 1997, seventy-eight per-cent of 27,402 private elementary and
secondary schools in the United States were religiously affiliated. Stephen P. Broughman &
Lenore A. Colaciello, NAT'L CENTER OF EDUC. STATISTICS, OFFICE OF EDuc. RESEARCH AND
IMPROVEMENT,

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

U.S.

DEP'T OF

EDUC.,

PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE STUDY

See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 778-779.
See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401-02.
See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 792-794; Ball, 473 U.S. at 394.
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
Id.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.

(1999).
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religion.' 15 The Court dismissed this claim with little explanation.' 1 6 In
fact, in footnote eleven, the Court stated that this prong only applies
when the program involves "direct financial subsidies.""II 7
Subsequently, the Court decided Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind.118 In Witters, a young man studying to become
a pastor, missionary, or youth director at a Christian college requested
funds from a Washington state vocational rehabilitation program. The
state agency refused to supply funds because the agency concluded that
it would violate the state constitution. The Washington Supreme Court
agreed, concluding that providing funds would violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court's decision." 9 The Court
concluded that provision of funds under the state program would not
violate the second prong of the Lemon test because the program "was
made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted."' 2 ° The significance to the Establishment Clause jurisprudence was to once again
weaken the "effects" prong of Lemon. Witters was viewed by the Court
as similar to the case in Nyquist, thus limiting impermissible effects of
advancing religion to the narrow category established in Nyquist where
the provisions of the program affect the choice of whether the student
will use the reimbursement for public or secular schools. 2 '
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District'22 also weakened
Lemon's "effects" prong."' Zobrest held that providing an interpreter to
a deaf Catholic high school student, pursuant to the Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),' 2 4 did not violate the Establishment
Clause.' 2 5 The Court's reasoning was similar to that of Witters.'26
Zobrest is distinguishable from School District of Grand Rapids v.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 403-04 n.ll.

118. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
119. Id. at 481-485.
120. Id. at 487-488 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-783). "Because of the manner in which
we have resolved the tuition grant issue, we need not decide whether the significantly religious
character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the assistance (e.g., scholarships) made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the

institution benefited." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38.
121. Witters v. Wash. Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).

122. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1993).
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
Vaccari, supra note 2, at 36.
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Ball' 27 and Meek v. Pittenger 2 8 because the Zobrest program did not
relieve the school of costs that the school would have normally incurred.
The fact that this was an interpreter was another important point that the
Court noted in its reasoning. As in Mueller, the Court pointed out that
the choice was being made by the individual's parents and not the legis12 9
lature that created the statute.
Agostini v. Felton,130 is the most recent case concerning religious
school funding. In response to the decision in Aguilar, the New York
School Board provided vans to pick up students from parochial schools
and taught the students in the vans.' 3 ' Petitioners in Agostini claimed
that the requirements of Aguilar should not be imposed in their case
because it would be too expensive. 3 2 Furthermore, the petitioners
claimed that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
had changed so as to undermine Aguilar and required that it be overturned. 3 3 Petitioners cited views expressed by five Justices in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,134 and subsequent holdings in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind, ' Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District,136 and Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,137 to indicate that the holding of Agui38
lar was no longer good law.'
The Court in Agostini still inquired whether the program in question had a secular purpose, claiming that the first prong of the Lemon
test had not changed. 39 The second prong, while changed, was still
utilized. The Agostini opinion views the "effects" prong and the "entanglement" prong concurrently. The Court stated that it will still examine
whether the statute advances religion, but that the level necessary to
127. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (striking down a program providing public school teachers to teach

supplemental courses in non-public schools).
128. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down a Pennsylvania law that provides loans of educational
materials and equipment directly to religious schools).
129. "By awarding parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute insures that a
government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private
decision of individual parents. In other words, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive
for parents to choose a sectarian school, and interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to
state decision making." Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
130. 521 U.S. 203 (1997) reversing in part Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and Sch.
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
131. Id. at 213.
132. Id. at 215-16.
133. Id. at 216.
134. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
135. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
136. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
137. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
138. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216-223.
139. Id. at 222-23.
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render it "an impermissible effect has changed."' 4 0
The program in Agostini was compared to the interpreter program
in Zobrest because the Court found no reason to conclude that the teachers' presence would advance religion.' 4 ' This approach represents a
move away from an approach which recognizes that symbolic endorse42
ment of religion can constitute an Establishment Clause violation.
The Court also compared this case to Witters by stating that not all direct
aid of religious schools is establishing religion. 43 The key is that there
is a "genuinely independent and private choice of individuals."'"
There has been a shift in the Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
but the extent and the nature of that shift are debatable. There is some
thought that the Supreme Court is moving towards accommodation of
religion, while others see the shift as a move toward neutralism. 45
Neither of these theories completely explain the Court's position
because in Mueller and Agostini the Court's method still looks at the
impact of government action and the only change is what the Court sees
as advancing religion. The Court does not look at any form of accommodation in determining advancement of religion, but rather the Court
looks at the impact on individual choice and economic benefits.
III.

READING THE RELIGION CLAUSES

There are two ways of looking at the neutrality of the government's
actions toward religion. One is of means and the other is of ends.
A.

Neutral Means

This view is often referred to as neutrality because the concept
asserts that as long as the development of law, i.e., the law making process, is neutral toward religion, neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clause is implicated. Religious organizations are treated like
any other organization. If the government is regulating other charitable
organizations, then a church could be regulated.
This theory is based on the assumption that the religious clauses
address the danger of the government making decisions concerning
religion. If religion is treated the same as all other institutions, then the
140. Id. at 223.
141. Id. at 224.
142. See Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975).
143. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225-26.
144. Id. at 226 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986)).
145. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1991).
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state has not acted toward religion specifically. Regardless of the consequences under this theory, there is no recourse under the First Amendment as long as the legislative process was neutral. The legislative body
should not consider the effects its legislation may have on religion, positive or negative. If the legislative process treats all alike, then neither
the Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clauses has been offended.
This approach is not concerned with the actual effects of government action on religion. Supporters argue that a neutral approach will
protect the community from government abuse and prevent the government from affecting religious participation. 4 6 Thus, according to this
approach, neutrality in the legislative process is the goal of these two
dueling religion-related clauses. Were the legislature to treat religious
institutions differently so as to avoid a positive effect upon religion, that
action would favor the Establishment Clause at the cost of the Free
Exercise Clause. This is a facially valid argument. The reason that the
Constitution prohibits state establishment of a religion and state interference with religious practices was surely to ensure government neutrality
toward religion.
The shift toward neutrality can be seen in the Court's treatment of
the Free Exercise Clause in the case of Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.'4 7 Smith held that the

Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the application of Oregon drug
law to the religious ingestion of peyote. The Smith Court upheld the
Oregon law because a neutral, generally applicable law needs only a
rational basis of a permissible state interest, even if it burdens one's
religious practice.' 48 Although the Oregon drug law interfered with the
Native American religious use of peyote, the Court found no violation of
the Free Exercise Clause, because the state had a permissible interest in
regulating drug use.149
Neutrality is heralded as preventing discrimination against religion
in the name of the Establishment Clause. 50 Neutrality does not, however, always provide more protection of free exercise of religion. The
problem is best illustrated by example. For example, suppose that Wisconsin public law required children to attend school until age sixteen. 5 '
146. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 11 (1989).
147. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
148. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
149. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1992).

150. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 572 U.S. 1013 (1999) (mem.) (Thomas, J.
dissenting). "[Tlhe Constitution requires, at a minimum, neutrality not hostility toward religion."
Id.
151. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972).
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The legislative process underlying this regulation was neutral toward
religion.15 2 The act was not designed to promote or burden religion.
The legislature's concern was the education of the state's children. If
neutrality was the only concern of the Establishment/Free Exercise
Clause dichotomy, there would be no problem with this law. Additionally, assume that at this time there was a large Amish population in
Wisconsin that did not believe in formal education past the eighth grade.
The Amish religion and social structure depends on the children being
taught in the ways of the Amish. By removing their children from
school at the age deemed appropriate by their religious convictions, the
Amish were in violation of this religiously neutral law. Based on these
facts, Wisconsin v. Yoder 5 3 held that a facially neutral law violated the
Free Exercise clause. This was a narrow exception carved out for the
Amish by Chief Justice Burger based on the denial of free exercise of
religion.1 54 If the neutrality argument had been adopted in Yoder,
neither the Court nor the legislature could have made this exception for
the Amish or others with adverse religious beliefs.
Whether the two religious clauses are "directly at war," as claimed
herein, depends on how they are construed. The clauses should be interpreted as being at war with each other, because that way a balance can
be struck. The easiest way to read the language of the religious clauses
is that there should be a balance. One says no establishment of religion
and the other says no interference with religion. They appear to try to
strike a compromise.
Religion must be treated differently during the legislative process
in order to achieve neutral effects on religion. According to the neutrality argument, this is exactly the problem the religious clauses were
intended to prevent. At first blush, the right answer seems to be to simply treat religion the same as any other subject during the legislative
process in order to ensure that government actors are not acting on
behalf of religion or against religion. This approach, however, does not
protect religion at all (as argued in the discussion of Wisconsin v.
Yoder). That argument aside, the language of the First Amendment supports the view that religion must be looked at separately. The First
Amendment treats religion differently. The First Amendment specifically mentions religion as an area that the government cannot interfere
with, positively or negatively. Government actors are commanded to
consider the effects of their actions on religion. This cannot be done by
152. Id. at 213.
153. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding parents have a direct, personal right to control the religious
upbringing and training of their minor children).
154. Id. at 220-21.
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putting on blindfolds and treating churches, synagogues, mosques, etc.,
like the Rotary Club. Professor Ely makes a similar
argument concern1 55
ing the First Amendment Free Speech clause.
I can certainly understand the instinct that might incline one to minimize the number of occasions in which the judiciary could become
involved in assessing the importance of the interest the state adduces to
support its regulation. But, some attention to that question is unavoidable ... if there is to be review at all. Moreover, the theory that demands

156
review in the first place demands that judicial review attend to ends.
The appropriate relationship between the government and religion is
neutrality in the legislative process, and neutrality in the effects of government regulation on individuals expressing their religious beliefs. The
dichotomy between means and ends is complex and the issues intermingle, such that one cannot be discussed without the other.

B.

Neutral Ends

The other view of the Establishment Clause focuses on the effects
of government regulation rather than the means of government regulation. 157 How does government action affect religion? The Lemon test
asks whether state action 1) has a secular purpose; 2) promotes religion;
or 3) excessively intermingles. This is a retrospective look at state
action. Advocates of the neutrality theory believe that religion must not
be treated differently, but the Establishment Clause requires that religion
be treated differently.' 58
How a particular piece of legislation affects religion is crucial to its
constitutionality. The Establishment Clause prohibits government promotion of religion and the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government
interference with religion. The result is legislation that does not, in
effect, help or hurt religion. This approach requires that religion be
treated differently in the legislative process so that the effect is neutral.
Does it matter that the legislature did not intend to promote religion or is
it more important that it actually did? Ask the Amish whether they care
if the Wisconsin Legislature intended to harm their children's upbringing in the Amish lifestyle, or if they care that it had the effect of doing
just that? When one's individual exercise of religion is at stake, the
impact of government action is of more concern. The intended or unin155. JOHN HART
156. Id. at 106.

ELY, DEMOCRACY

AND DISTRUST

(1980).

157. See generally Lupa, supra note 145.
158. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43
(1997). Laycock refers to neutrality theory as nondiscriminatory theory.
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tended result of a voucher plan is to provide government funds to religious institutions, which raises establishment concerns.
Neutralist theory disagrees, because, according to neutralist theory,
it is violative of the Establishment Clause for legislatures and courts to
engage in such a balance.' 59 Neutrality supporters argue that a court
should not examine the centrality of a religious practice. The judicial
system, however, is well equipped to weigh the impact of government
action on religion. The court system is where the religious clauses are
best evaluated. The political process should deal, as best it can, with
preventing abuse of legislative mandates. But, when the legislature
inevitably fails to protect minorities, the judicial system is the appropriate body to uphold the ideals of the religious clauses. Judges will not be
placed in the position of determining religious issues forbidden by the
Establishment Clause, because an injury must be shown to have
occurred either to one attempting to practice her religious faith (an
implication of the Free Exercise Clause) or to a taxpayer by way of state
aid to a religious institution (an implication of the Establishment
Clause). There is, of course, a level of judicial interpretation required to
determine whether an injury rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Determining whether an injury has occurred, however, is a valid
judicial role. Process-oriented neutrality will not simplify the adjudication of these types of cases.
A neutral-ends approach to the determination of whether government action violates the religious clauses does not make for neat line
drawing and precedent setting, hence the mess in the current system.
The Court's concern, however, should not be limited to efficiency.
There may be a social benefit to indoctrinating students with a particular
religious doctrine. Conversely, the political majority may deem suppression of an unpopular religious practice or belief socially beneficial.' 6° These two contradictory clauses prevent legislative bodies from
making neutrally applicable law and washing their hands of the consequences. The consequences should matter.
Under a position that looks purely at effects, however, the secular
purpose prong of the Lemon test would be abolished. This prong is not
helpful in determining whether legislation will either negatively or positively affect religion. Under the Court's current regime, this prong has
become a mechanical touchstone that is so easy to fulfill that it serves no
purpose to require courts to go through the motions of applying it. For
example, in Mueller, where the legislature provided no purpose for the
tuition program, the Court merely created plausible secular purposes that
159. Id.
160. McConnell & Posner, supra note 146, at 9.
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sufficed to leap this non-existent hurdle.' 6 ' This prong has only been
used to strike down legislation in the case of Wallace v. Jaffree.'6 2
IV.

LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER

A.

Political Issues

The religious clauses of the First Amendment provide an important
protection for the autonomy of religious faiths. When the government
gives money to fund any group or activity, there are always strings
attached. Vouchers for religious schools will provide a way for government to regulate religious schools that has not been available before.
Vouchers do not treat religion neutrally because they will ultimately
result in government regulation of and intervention in religious institutions. The Constitution does not treat religion like other institutions and
organizations that may be subject to more government regulation.
While religious schools may, in the beginning, like the idea of a voucher
system, 6 3 they may not be as enthusiastic when subjected to the same
government regulations as any other school receiving government aid.
If vouchers are found to be constitutional based on an idea that the
vouchers are not a direct flow of funds to religion, then the state will be
able to impose the same anti-discrimination protections and open-meetings requirements on religious schools that are imposed upon public
schools. Government funding of private schools also creates a lack of
accountability, because private schools are not controlled by the taxpayers. Traditionally, taxpayers feel a need to monitor the usage of their tax
dollars, yet private schools, unlike public schools, do not have to adhere
164
to public laws that require open meetings or access to school records.
Nonpublic schools are not held to nondiscriminatory policies in admissions, hiring, and curriculum selection. 65 Tax funding of schools that
systematically discriminate may be found unconstitutional, if challenged, and would likely be very unsettling to many voters. 16 6 State
regulation of religious institutions in this manner is surely an "excessive
161. Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).

162. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that an Alabama statute authorizing public school teachers to
hold a one-minute moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer was unconstitutional for
lack of a secular purpose because the sponsor of the bill said the purpose was to "return voluntary
prayer" to the public schools).
163. Sham, supra note 5, at 3A (stating that "[p]rivate school vouchers" are "a priority of the

nations top Republican leaders, religious groups and some school reformers ....
164. Peterson, supra note 22, at 20.
165. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611 n.5 (1971). The plaintiffs in Lemon alleged an
equal protection violation because the private schools receiving funds practiced racial and
religious discrimination in hiring and admissions policies. They were held to lack standing for

failure to show that any of their children had been denied admission based on race or religion. Id.
166. See Doerr, supra, note 1, at 88.
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entanglement" of government with religion, if not a violation of free
exercise. Essentially, this opens up a host of complex issues, which will
not lead to better treatment of religion or less interference by
government.
B.

Economic Issues

Voucher programs are a market approach to school reform, so a
discussion of economic issues is appropriate. There are several economic approaches that can be taken in defining the Establishment
Clause.' 67 A discussion focused on tuition payments is particularly
aided by an examination of the economic issues involved. Government
funding typically has the effect of expanding the funded activity,
whereas taxing an activity will reduce participation in the activity. The
same effect will be seen if the government pays for or taxes religious
school attendance. 68 "[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted
cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or
not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into the sectarian
institutions."'' 69 Every rational business decision takes into account subsidies given for an activity.
Introducing a market approach to the education system will create
dependence on private and religious institutions for the education of our
children. Commitment to a market system is commitment to interdependence. Competition is dependant on market forces of supply and
demand and market actors. This is the kind of excessive entanglement
of government and religion that the Establishment Clause prohibits. "In
the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid
derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral
and non-ideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in
' 17
whatever form is invalid." 1
An argument is often made that parents should have the choice to
send their child to a religious school because it is their tax money to
spend as they choose (i.e., the taxpayer is simply choosing the forum in
which their tax money for education will be spent). This argument is
flawed because all taxpayers have an interest in the government's mandate to refrain from establishing a religion. Every taxpayer has standing
to bring a claim that the government is fostering religion. One taxpayer
using her tax money to fund religion in an unconstitutional manner
167. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 146.

168. See id. at 5.
169. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973).
170. Id. at 780 (Marshall dissenting).
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(whatever that may be) injures every other taxpayer. Neither the burden
of paying taxes for public schools and paying for religious schools, nor
"the State's purposes ... justif[ies] an eroding of the limitations of the

Establishment Clause now firmly implanted."'' The taxpayer claiming
a violation is not going to be the one sending her child to a religious
school on the government's bill. If only the tax money of the parent
sending the child to a religious school was being used, then the complainant would not have an injury. The standing doctrine states that an
injury does exist to the taxpayer. The argument that the money is my tax
dollars going to pay for my kids fails. The argument just does not coincide with Establishment Clause standing.
V.

APPLYING THE PRECEDENTS TO VOUCHERS

The Supreme Court's shift in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence has left lower courts in a state of confusion. State and federal
courts have not been consistent in their decisions concerning the Establishment Clause.172 Some jurisdictions have maintained strict adherence
173
to the Lemon test, while others have strayed from this convention.
Simply excluding religious schools from a voucher plan has not
saved controversy, as has been demonstrated by Maine and Milwaukee's
voucher programs. Maine's voucher program pays to send students to
public school or a state-approved private school in districts without a
high school.' 74 Originally, the program allowed parochial schools, but
in 1981 the Maine legislature excluded parochial schools from a tuition
176
payment program, 75 at the suggestion of the Attorney General,
because of the Supreme Court's holding in Nyquist.177 Maine's high
school tuition reimbursement plan for school districts without a public
high school was challenged under the Constitution for excluding relig78
ious schools. Parochial school parents sued and lost in both federal1
17 9
and state Court.
The First Circuit held in Strout v. Albanese that the exclusion of
sectarian schools in the Maine voucher program did not violate the
Establishment Clause and did not implicate the free exercise clause.' 80
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 789.
See text and accompanying notes infra Part II.B.
Id.
Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 130 (Me. 1999).
20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951, subd. 2.

176. See Me. Op. Att'y Gen. 80-2, 1980 WL 119258, at *11 (1980).
177. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 138; Op. Me. Att'y Gen 80-2.
178. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 931 (1999).
179. See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).

180. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 931 (1999).
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The statute was challenged on establishment clause, free exercise, equal
protection, free speech, and due process grounds.181 The question was
framed as "whether Maine is constitutionally required to extend subsidies to sectarian schools."' 82 The case, however, presented the opposite
question of whether or not vouchers for religious schools are an impermissible funding of religion, but is useful for examining the method of
balancing the free exercise of the parents who wish to send their children
to a religious high school with the Establishment Clause. The parents
claimed that the statute was hostile to religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 8 3 This proposition was found to have no supporting
authority. 184 The court stated that the Establishment Clause was sufficient to permit a government action that might otherwise infringe upon
the free exercise of religion.'85 The court relied heavily on Nyquist in
order to find that direct aid to sectarian schools would violate the Establishment Clause. 86 The court stated that to hold any other way would
be to extend the current precedents. 8 7 The circuit court held to a strict
separationist view by refusing to imply anything from the latest Establishment Clause decisions of the Supreme Court. The court stated that
"approving direct payments of tuition by the state to sectarian schools
represents a quantum leap that we are unwilling to take."' 88
The Maine Supreme Court has been unwilling to use any of the
Supreme Court's precedents to weaken the Establishment Clause. 18 9
The same issue was raised in state court in Bagley v. Raymond School
Department.9 ° This state court counterpart to Strout took a stronger
position concerning the constitutionality of this voucher program. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine noted that the Maine Constitution provided no more protections than the federal constitution, so the court simply analyzed the federal constitutional issues."' The court found the
statutes placed no substantial burden on free exercise of religion.' 92 As
181. Id. at 59.
182. Id. at 60.

183. Id.
184. Id. at 60-61.
185. Id. at 61.

186. Id. at 62.
187. Id. at 62 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) and Zobrest v. Cataling Foothills
Sch. Dist. 509 U.S. 1 (1993)).
188. Strout, 178 F.3d at 64.
189. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947

(1999) (holding a tuition program that excluded religious schools did not violate the Establishment
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, or Equal Protection Clause).
190.
191.
Clause,
192.

Id. Petition for certiorari filed, 68 USLW 3105 (Jul. 22, 1999) (No. 99-163).
Id. at 132, (petitioners claimed violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment
and the Equal Protection Clause.)
Id. at 135.
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to the Establishment Clause, the court held that no part of the Establishment Clause required the state government to subsidize religious
participation. 93
The court's reasoning regarding the Equal Protection claim in Bagley is more interesting to this discussion. The court determined that in

order for the exclusion to withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Establishment Clause must mandate the exclusion of religious schools from the program. 94 The court, therefore, examined the
constitutionality of a program that included religious schools. 1 95 Based
on an extensive examination of the precedents, the court held that inclusion of religious schools would violate the Establishment Clause. 196

This was different from the district court's holding that exclusion of
religious schools is constitutional, and went further to say that inclusion
would be unconstitutional. 9 7 The court used the Equal Protection

Clause to find that not only was this program constitutional, but also that
a program that included religious schools would be unconstitutional. 198
Milwaukee's voucher program at one time excluded religious
schools from receiving vouchers that were provided to students of certain low-income families.' 99 The "Milwaukee Parental Choice Program" partially reimbursed eligible students for the tuition of private

nonreligious schools.2z" It was challenged in federal court by eligible
students and parents who wished to use the tuition reimbursement at
religious schools. 2 ' They claimed that the school choice program violated the free exercise and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.2 °2 Like the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the District Court20 3

held that an expansion of the tuition reimbursement program to religious
schools would violate the Establishment Clause. 0 4 While the First Cir193. Id. at 136.
194. Id. at 1380.

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.

199. Tamara Henry, Florida Pupils Teach Nation About Vouchers State's System Called a
'Money-Back Guarantee,' USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 1999, at ID.
200. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (enacted 1990, amended 1993 and
1995). Students and their families must be low-income as defined by statute. § 119.23(2)(a).
Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209, 1210-11 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (discussing the procedure of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program).
201. Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.Wis. 1995).
202. Id. at 1211-12. Plaintiffs brought a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. 1994), which was later dropped. Id. at 1212 n.7.
203. Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1216. The "Milwaukee Parental Choice Program" had withstood
Wisconsin constitutional challenges that did not raise issues of free exercise or establishment of
religion. Davis v. Grover 480 N.W. 2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
204. Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1216.
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cuit upheld the constitutionality of a voucher plan that excluded religious schools, 2°5 the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that inclusion of
religious schools in a voucher program would violate the constitutional

mandate of the Establishment Clause.20 6
Despite the District Court's ruling, the Wisconsin Legislature
amended "Milwaukee Parental Choice Program" in 1995 to include sectarian schools.20 7 These amendments were challenged in state court
under the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions. 20 8 The Court of Appeals of

Wisconsin correctly looked to the state constitutional claims, first noting
that the language of the Wisconsin Constitution placed stricter separation between the state and religion than the U.S. Constitution. 20 9 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court took the opposite position and first looked at

the U.S. Constitution to find the inclusion of religious schools in the
tuition program constitutional under both the U.S. Constitution and the
Wisconsin Constitution.210
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has recognized that the Wisconsin
Constitution requires stricter separation of state and religion than the
U.S. Constitution's Estblishment Clause. 1 1

If the Supreme Court

adopts a neutrality approach, then Wisconsin's and other state constitutions that impose stricter separation between church and state, may be
unconstitutional.212
Arizona extended Mueller v. Allen's holding to apply to vouch205. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
206. Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1216.
207. 1995 Wis. Act 27 §§ 4002-4009. See also Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W. 2d 407, 412
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (describing the amended "Milwaukee Parental Choice Program").
208. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W. 2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
209. Jackson, 570 N.W. 2d at 416-17.
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend,
erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent;
nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted,
or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious
societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
WIS. CONST. ART. I, § 18.
210. Jackson, 578 N.W. 2d at 610-621.
211. Jackson, 570 N.W. 2d. at 416-17.
[W]e may look for guidance to analyses employed by the United States Supreme
Court in Establishment Clause cases, however: 'Some questions cannot be fully
illuminated by the light of federal jurisprudence alone, but may require examination
according to the dictates of the more expansive protections envisioned by our state
constitution.
Id. at 417 (citing State v. Miller, 549 N.W. 2d 235, 239 (1996)).
212. Frank R. Kemer, The ConstitutionalDimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C. L. &
C. R. 137, 181-82 (1998).
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ers. 2 3 Arizona created a tax credit to individuals who donate to tuition
credit programs. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the tax credit
under Mueller v. Allen.214
Ohio's school voucher program provided "scholarships" to lowincome families to be used at certain private or public schools in adjacent school districts. 2 ' 5 There were a limited number of scholarships
granted each year and a maximum amount that would be reimbursed. 21 6
Eighty-five percent of the students who received the scholarships
attended secular schools. 2 7 Funds were sent to the chosen school,
where the parents endorsed the check to the school, but there were no
restrictions on how the school spent the money.2" 8
The program was challenged in state court as violating the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and various provisions of the Ohio
Constitution. 2 9 The Ohio Supreme Court applied Lemon in upholding
the voucher program under the federal and state Constitutions, but noted
that the validity of Lemon has been questioned.22 ° Subsequent statutes
were passed in compliance with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to
strike down the program pursuant to the "one-subject rule" of the Ohio
Constitution concerning appropriations bills, 22 1 but the procedures
remained the same for disbursement of vouchers. 222
The federal constitutional issues raised by the voucher program
were presented to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio. 2 3 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted.224 The case is a good example of how lower courts
are struggling to apply the Establishment Clause precedents. The District Court made an interesting maneuver in determining the constitutionality of the Ohio Scholarship Program. Although the court stated
that it must determine whether or not the statute complied with the
213.
(1999).
214.
215.
216.
217.

Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz.) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810, 528 U.S. 921

Id. at 625.
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 (N.D. On. 1999).
146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 898.
Simmons-Harris, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
218. Id. at 728.
219. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E. 2d 203, 207 (Ohio 1999) (striking down the
Scholarship Program as violative of Article II, section 15(D), of the Ohio Constitution in "that
creation of a substantive program in a general appropriations bill violates the one-subject rule").
220. Goff, 711 N.E. 2d at 207-08 (listing various opinions challenging Lemon).
221. Id. at 216.
222. Education Budget Bill, OHIo REV. CODE §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (1999).

223. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 727. The court found that the plaintiffs could relitigate the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise issues because the Ohio Supreme Court's decision as to
these issues was not essential to its judgment. Id. at 731.
224. Id. at 742.
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Lemon test, 225 it never evaluated the statute under the Lemon regime.
Instead, the court examined Nyquist, Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and

Agostini.22 6 The court found Nyquist to be binding precedent in this
case because, as with the New York statute, the reality of the program
was that the majority of the private schools were religious, and the funds
were not restricted to secular activities.227 The court then felt the obligation to examine Mueller and its progeny to determine whether they
undermined Nyquist.2 28 The court noted that in Mueller the Supreme
Court stated that Nyquist was not being overruled. 22 9 The Ohio program
was found to be distinguishable from Mueller because there were no
public schools participating in the Ohio scholarship program, and as
such parents did not have a significant choice between religious and
nonreligious schools.2 3 ° In addition, the majority of nonpublic schools
were religious, so the program was not neutral to the religious choice
made by the parents, and the benefit realized by religious schools in
Ohio was greater than in Mueller's tax deduction scheme. 231 The court
examined Witters and Zobrest,
but found that neither undermined the
232
binding precedent of Nyquist.
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION

The meaning of the Establishment Clause has, and continues to be,
developed through case law. The approach has been to determine the
law by looking at the facts of the cases and the results to determine the
appropriate results in future situations. From this exercise a pattern
develops, hopefully providing some indicia of how subsequent cases are
to be adjudicated. As discussed in Part II.B infra, this fact/result
approach does not provide much predictability for the Establishment
Clause, because the results are diverse. 33 One cannot just look at the
prior cases' facts and results to determine how vouchers would withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The method of getting a result from a case involving the Establishment Clause used to be Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 34 While the Court has not
officially abandoned Lemon, the recent precedents show that there is
225. Id. at 732-33.
226. See generally id. at 733-41.

227. Id. at 735.
228. Id.

229. Id. at 736.
230. Id. at 737.
231. Id. at 738, 739.

232. Id. at 739.
233. See cases cited supra note 49.
234. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:419

something else going on in the space between fact and result in current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.2 35 There has to be an underlying
justification for changing the interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
A change in the composition of the Supreme Court is not a justifiable
reason.
The rationale, of course, is a good place to look, but when the rationale of the Court appears to be changing, this too has limited benefits.
Rationales can change if there is a logical reason for the change. Since
the Supreme Court is unwilling to take up the issue of vouchers, lower
courts and legislators must try to determine the rationale the current
Supreme Court is using.
If the rules concerning the Establishment Clause have changed,
then the new approach needs to be clearly defined. While vouchers have
become a widespread issue which has produced conflicting results in
lower courts thereby meriting Supreme Court review, every issue cannot
be decided by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, has a responsibility to establish rules for legislatures and lower courts.2 36 "[T]he
Supreme Court is risking one of its core functions as the nation's highest
court: bringing a measure of consistency to the law, so that legal rules on
issues ... are the same nationwide. 2 1 3 The volatility of the Establishment Clause puts the time and money states are investing in voucher
schemes in danger. "'By not taking the case, they [the Supreme Court]
have left a lot of things to happen that may have to be undone or
redone,' says Elliot Mincberg of People for the American Way, which
challenged the Wisconsin voucher program for religious schools. 'The
result is a lot more confusion and political conflict."' 2 3 8
The current state of the Establishment Clause makes a governmentfunded voucher system that includes religious schools too great of a
leap. Several church-state issues were recently appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.2 9 The issues included tuition assistance programs, such as vouchers, to student-led prayer in public schools, and
tax-exemptions for religious publications.2 4 ° The Court is taking Mitchell v. Helms 4 ' to make another step in the direction of tearing down
Lemon. The new Establishment Clause jurisprudence suggests that it is
235.
(1983).
236.
237.
238.

See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
See generally Mauro, supra note 39, at IA.
Id.
Id.

239. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Gets Chance at Church-StateIssues, NEW
Sept. 19, 1999, at A8.
240. See id.
241. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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unlikely that the court will hold that tuition paid to religious schools is a
violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court has to take small
incremental steps by carefully choosing the cases they will hear. The
Court needs to base its reasoning on the secular purpose of the challenged legislation and show that it is because of the neutrality of the
legislative actions that any subsequent benefits to religion are not the
product of government action.
Justice Thomas has made clear that he is ready to make a radical
change.2 42 He wanted to grant certiorari to a case involving a Maryland
program that provided financial aid to private colleges.24 3 Columbia
Union College was excluded by the state from the program for being
"too religious. ' '2 44 Thomas said in his dissent that the "pervasively sectarian" test should be abandoned, 4 5 because it makes two unfounded
assumptions. First, "the Establishment Clause prohibits government
funds from ever benefiting, either directly or indirectly, 'religious' activities".246 The Court used to state that some benefits to religion were
permissible but that the limit was a matter of degree.2 47 In this view, it
is the impact upon religion that is to be guarded against. Abandonment
of the idea of the degree or nature of the benefit looks more like a neutral process approach.
Second, the "other [assumption] is that any institution that takes
religion seriously cannot be trusted to observe this prohibition. 2 4 8 This
assumption, however, is not made if one believes that the government
action is to be neutral. Rather, the issue is that the more pervasive the
religion, the more danger that the funds will impermissibly aid religion.
The issue goes back to degree. Thomas seems to be assuming that
degree has been done away with, but that has not been explicit in any
Supreme Court case. Thomas says that the Court's new "neutrality"
should force Maryland to include Columbia Union College so as to prevent hostility toward religion.2 49 Thomas's assumption that the Court
has fully embraced neutrality is debatable, but he is correct that "the
growing confusion among the lower courts illustrates that we cannot
long avoid addressing the important issues that it presents. 2 5 °
242. Id. at 826-827.
243. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013 (1999).
244. Id. at 1013.

245. Id. at 1014. But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (discussing the "pervasive religious orientation" of some of the schools that participate in
Ohio's
246.
247.
248.

Scholarship Program).
Id.
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Columbia Union College, 527 U.S. at 1014.

249. See id. at 1014-1015.
250. Id. at 1015.
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One example that neutrality has not been fully adopted by the Court
is Justice O'Connor's strong opinion in Agostini. In writing for the
Court, O'Connor makes a concerted effort to assure that the Court is not
overturning any precedents without doing so explicitly. 51 She may be
the key member of the Court who determines the truth of this statement.
By loosening the constraints of the Establishment Clause, the Court
is allowing states more freedom in educational reform. This may be
appealing to many who believe that state and local governments best
handle education, which are no doubt the arenas where such power
resides. The Supreme Court, however, cannot circumvent the issue of
the constitutionality of these programs. The justices' political opinions
cannot override the guarantees of the First Amendment, nor should any
state court be tempted to overlook the prevailing authority of the Establishment Clause2 52 so that the state legislature may reform education.
"Where such fundamental rights as those expressed in the First Amendment are at stake, we must examine the issues independently, and we
will not limit our inquiry by the constraints of the often relied on deference to legislative findings. 2 53
Lemon v. Kurtzman has been widely criticized through subsequent
cases, making it difficult to determine how the Supreme Court would
evaluate vouchers. Nyquist stated that the Lemon prongs should be
"viewed as guidelines. 25 4 Mueller characterized the Lemon test as "no
more than a helpful signpost. ' 255 Lynch v. Donnelly 256 went so far as
to say that Lemon had never been binding. "The court essentially collapsed the Lemon test so that the focus is on whether the challenged
activity has the effect of advancing religion. 257 In Agostini, O'Connor
combined the effect and entanglement prongs into one inquiry into the
advancement of religion. Using the approach in Agostini, the first prong
will be applied and will generally pass because of the clear and legitimate purpose of providing education. All of the lower court rulings on
voucher plans have held them to have a secular purpose.
Under Mueller and Agostini, the Court does not have to uphold
tuition payments to religious schools. Lemon, while perhaps a bit
bruised, is not dead.
251. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).
252. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the Establishment Clause to
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
253. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127, 133 (Me. 1999).
254. Comm. for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773, n.31 (1973).
255. Mueller v. Allan, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).

256. 464 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
257. Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (D.N.J. 1998); see Augustini v. Felton, 521

U.S. 203 (1997).
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We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should

conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an
earlier precedent. We reaffirm that if a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decision, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.258
The Court must give an adequate justification to overturn such an important precedent. The justification needed is not present, so the Court has
correctly not taken such a bold step. The Ohio Supreme Court noted
that even "[i]n its most recent Establishment Clause case [Agostini], the
Supreme Court used the principles set forth in the Lemon test, even as it
modified the analytical framework with the three-prongs. ' '259 The Court
is showing respect for the doctrine of stare decise.
The Supreme Court has said, "it may not be possible to promote the
former [Free Exercise] without offending the later [Establishment
Clause]." 26 According to the Court, the two clauses inevitably collide,
and an attempt must be made to reach a compromise between the two.
The compromise could be a line drawn in the sand, but, as with most
legal line drawing, there would be a level of arbitrariness. Perhaps the
correct view is not to attempt to find a line, but rather a balance. This is
arguably not the cleanest approach, but may be unavoidable in order to
give both clauses due respect. Cases concerning free exercise and establishment of religion are not best looked at as to whether they fall more
on one side of the line or another, but rather through looking at the
essence of the church and state relationship the Court's rationale in its
First Amendment precedents, and the inner-workings of the situation at
hand.
The Establishment Clause, whatever it does protect, does not
change with the composition of the Supreme Court. This is the nice
theoretical truth that most would agree is not reality and others would
say should not be the truth. "The Supreme Court's evolving treatment
of the Establishment Clause has been a study in the changing forces of
our society. ' 26 ' While some areas of constitutional protections may

258.
259.
260.
261.

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E. 2d 203, 208 (Ohio 1999).
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788.
Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept. 728 A.2d 127, 138 (Me. 1999).
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need to reflect societal change, the Establishment Clause is an area
where such movement is not a sound practice.
REBECCA

E.

LAWRENCE*

* The author would like to express her gratitude to John Hart Ely for his contribution to this
article, despite a difference of opinion.

